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<title>Is–ought problem</title>

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<span id="openzim-page-title" class="mw-page-title-main"><span class="mw-page-title-main">Is–ought problem</span></span>

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<p>The <b>is–ought problem</b>, as articulated by the Scottish <a href="Philosopher" class="mw-redirect" title="Philosopher">philosopher</a> and <a href="Historian" title="Historian">historian</a> <a href="David_Hume" title="David Hume">David Hume</a>, arises when one makes claims about what <i>ought</i> to be that are based solely on statements about what <i>is</i>. Hume found that there seems to be a significant difference between <a href="Descriptive_Statement" class="mw-redirect" title="Descriptive Statement">descriptive statements</a> (about what is) and <a href="Prescriptive_statement" class="mw-redirect" title="Prescriptive statement">prescriptive statements</a> (about what ought to be), and that it is not obvious how one can coherently transition from descriptive statements to prescriptive ones.

</p><p><b>Hume's law</b> or <b>Hume's guillotine</b><sup id="cite_ref-Black1964_1-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-Black1964-1"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>1<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> is the thesis that an <a href="Ethics" title="Ethics">ethical</a> or judgmental conclusion cannot be inferred from purely descriptive factual statements.<sup id="cite_ref-sep_2-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-sep-2"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>2<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup>

</p><p>A similar view is defended by <a href="G._E._Moore" title="G. E. Moore">G. E. Moore</a>'s <a href="Open-question_argument" title="Open-question argument">open-question argument</a>, intended to refute any identification of <a href="Morality" title="Morality">moral</a> properties with natural <a href="Property_(philosophy)" title="Property (philosophy)">properties</a>, which is asserted by <a href="Ethical_naturalism" title="Ethical naturalism">ethical naturalists</a>, who do not deem the <a href="Naturalistic_fallacy" title="Naturalistic fallacy">naturalistic fallacy</a> a fallacy.

</p><p>The is–ought problem is closely related to the <a href="Fact%E2%80%93value_distinction" title="Fact–value distinction">fact–value distinction</a> in <a href="Epistemology" title="Epistemology">epistemology</a>. Though the terms are often used interchangeably, academic discourse concerning the latter may encompass <a href="Aesthetics" title="Aesthetics">aesthetics</a> in addition to <a href="Ethics" title="Ethics">ethics</a>.

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<div class="mw-heading mw-heading2"><h2 id="Overview">Overview</h2></div>

<p>Hume discusses the problem in book III, part I, section I of his book, <i><a href="A_Treatise_of_Human_Nature" title="A Treatise of Human Nature">A Treatise of Human Nature</a></i> (1739):

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</style><blockquote class="templatequote"><p>In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remarked, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary way of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surprised to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, <i>is</i>, and <i>is not</i>, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an <i>ought</i>, or an <i>ought not</i>. This change is imperceptible; but is, however, of the last consequence. For as this <i>ought</i>, or <i>ought not</i>, expresses some new relation or affirmation, it's necessary that it should be observed and explained; and at the same time that a reason should be given, for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it. But as authors do not commonly use this precaution, I shall presume to recommend it to the readers; and am persuaded, that this small attention would subvert all the vulgar systems of morality, and let us see, that the distinction of vice and virtue is not founded merely on the relations of objects, nor is perceived by reason.<sup id="cite_ref-3" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-3"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>3<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup><sup id="cite_ref-4" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-4"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>4<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup></p></blockquote>

<p>Hume calls for caution against such inferences in the absence of any explanation of how the ought-statements follow from the is-statements. But how exactly <i>can</i> an "ought" be derived from an "is"? The question, prompted by Hume's small paragraph, has become one of the central questions of ethical theory, and Hume is usually assigned the position that such a derivation is impossible.<sup id="cite_ref-5" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-5"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>5<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup>

</p><p>In modern times, "Hume's law" often denotes the informal thesis that, if a reasoner only has access to non-moral factual premises, the reasoner cannot logically infer the truth of moral statements; or, more broadly, that one cannot infer evaluative statements (including aesthetic statements) from non-evaluative statements.<sup id="cite_ref-sep_2-1" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-sep-2"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>2<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> An alternative definition of Hume's law is that "If P implies Q, and Q is moral, then P is moral". This <a href="Interpretation_(logic)" title="Interpretation (logic)">interpretation</a>-driven definition avoids a loophole with the <a href="Principle_of_explosion" title="Principle of explosion">principle of explosion</a>.<sup id="cite_ref-6" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-6"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>6<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> Other versions state that the is–ought gap can technically be formally bridged without a moral premise, but only in ways that are formally "vacuous" or "irrelevant", and that provide no "guidance". For example, one can infer from "The Sun is yellow" that "Either the Sun is yellow, or it is wrong to murder". But this provides no relevant moral guidance; absent a contradiction, one cannot deductively infer that "it is wrong to murder" solely from non-moral premises alone, adherents argue.<sup id="cite_ref-7" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-7"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>7<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup>

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<div class="mw-heading mw-heading2"><h2 id="Implications">Implications</h2></div>

<p>The apparent gap between "is" statements and "ought" statements, when combined with <a href="Hume's_fork" title="Hume's fork">Hume's fork</a>, renders "ought" statements of dubious validity. Hume's fork is the idea that all items of knowledge are based either on logic and definitions, or else on observation. If the is–ought problem holds, then "ought" statements do not seem to be known in either of these two ways, and it would seem that there can be no moral knowledge. <a href="Moral_skepticism" title="Moral skepticism">Moral skepticism</a> and <a href="Non-cognitivism" title="Non-cognitivism">non-cognitivism</a> work with such conclusions.

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<div class="mw-heading mw-heading2"><h2 id="Responses">Responses</h2></div>

<div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Oughts_and_goals">Oughts and goals</h3></div>

<p><a href="Ethical_naturalists" class="mw-redirect" title="Ethical naturalists">Ethical naturalists</a> contend that moral truths exist, and that their truth value relates to facts about physical reality. Many modern naturalistic philosophers see no impenetrable barrier in deriving "ought" from "is", believing it can be done whenever we analyze goal-directed behavior. They suggest that a statement of the form <i>"In order for agent </i>A<i> to achieve goal </i>B<i>, </i>A<i> reasonably ought to do </i>C<i>"</i> exhibits no <a href="Category_error" class="mw-redirect" title="Category error">category error</a> and may be factually verified or refuted. "Oughts" exist, then, in light of the existence of goals. A counterargument to this response is that it merely pushes back the "ought" to the subjectively valued "goal" and thus provides no fundamentally objective basis to one's goals which, consequentially, provides no basis of distinguishing moral value of fundamentally different goals. A <a href="Dialectical_naturalism" class="mw-redirect" title="Dialectical naturalism">dialectical naturalist</a> response to this objection is that although it is true that individual goals have a degree of subjectivity, the process through which the existence of goals is made possible is not subjective—that is, the advent of organisms capable of subjectivity, having occurred through the objective process of <a href="Evolution" title="Evolution">evolution</a>. This dialectical approach goes further to state that subjectivity should be conceptualized as objectivity at its highest point, having been the result of an unfolding developmental process.

</p><p>This is similar to work done by the moral philosopher <a href="Alasdair_MacIntyre" title="Alasdair MacIntyre">Alasdair MacIntyre</a>, who attempts to show that because ethical language developed in the West in the context of a belief in a human <a href="Telos_(philosophy)" class="mw-redirect" title="Telos (philosophy)">telos</a>—an end or goal—our inherited moral language, including terms such as good and bad, have functioned, and function, to evaluate the way in which certain behaviors facilitate the achievement of that telos. In an evaluative capacity, therefore, good and bad carry moral weight without committing a category error. For instance, a pair of scissors that cannot easily cut through paper can legitimately be called bad since it cannot fulfill its purpose effectively. Likewise, if a person is understood as having a particular purpose, then behaviour can be evaluated as good or bad in reference to that purpose. In plainer words, a person is acting good when that person fulfills that person's purpose.<sup id="cite_ref-after_virtue_8-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-after_virtue-8"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>8<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup>

</p><p>Even if the concept of an "ought" is meaningful, this need not involve morality. This is because some goals may be morally neutral, or (if they exist) against what is moral. A poisoner might realize his victim has not died and say, for example, "I ought to have used more poison," since his goal is to murder. The next challenge of a moral realist is thus to explain what is meant by a "<i>moral</i> ought".<sup id="cite_ref-9" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-9"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>9<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup>

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<div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Discourse_ethics">Discourse ethics</h3></div>

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</style><div role="note" class="hatnote navigation-not-searchable">Main article: <a href="Discourse_ethics" title="Discourse ethics">Discourse ethics</a></div>

<p>Proponents of discourse ethics argue that the very act of discourse implies certain "oughts", that is, certain <a href="Presupposition" title="Presupposition">presuppositions</a> that are necessarily accepted by the participants in discourse, and can be used to further derive prescriptive statements. They therefore argue that it is incoherent to argumentatively advance an ethical position on the basis of the is–ought problem, which contradicts these implied assumptions.

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<div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Moral_oughts">Moral oughts</h3></div>

<p>As MacIntyre explained, someone may be called a good person if people have an inherent purpose. Many ethical systems appeal to such a purpose. This is true of some forms of <a href="Moral_realism" title="Moral realism">moral realism</a>, which states that something can be wrong, even if every thinking person <i>believes</i> otherwise (the idea of <a href="Brute_fact" title="Brute fact">brute fact</a> about morality). The ethical realist might suggest that humans were created for a purpose (e.g. to serve God), especially if they are an <a href="Ethical_non-naturalist" class="mw-redirect" title="Ethical non-naturalist">ethical non-naturalist</a>. If the ethical realist is instead an <a href="Ethical_naturalist" class="mw-redirect" title="Ethical naturalist">ethical naturalist</a>, they may start with the fact that humans have <a href="Evolved" class="mw-redirect" title="Evolved">evolved</a> and pursue some sort of <a href="Evolutionary_ethics" title="Evolutionary ethics">evolutionary ethics</a> (which risks “committing” the <a href="Moralistic_fallacy" title="Moralistic fallacy">moralistic fallacy</a>).

Not all moral systems appeal to a human telos or purpose. This is because it is not obvious that people even <i>have</i> any sort of natural purpose, or what <a href="Teleology" title="Teleology">that purpose</a> would be. Although many scientists do recognize <a href="Teleonomy" title="Teleonomy">teleonomy</a> (a tendency in nature), few philosophers appeal to it (this time, to avoid the naturalistic fallacy).

</p><p>Goal-dependent oughts run into problems even without an appeal to an innate human purpose. Consider cases where one has no desire to be good—whatever it is. If, for instance, a person wants to be good, and good means washing one's hands, then it seems one morally ought to wash their hands. The bigger problem in moral philosophy is what happens if someone does <i>not</i> want to be good, whatever its origins? Put simply, in what sense <i>ought</i> we to hold the goal of being good? It seems one can ask "how am I rationally required to hold 'good' as a value, or to pursue it?"<sup id="cite_ref-10" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-10"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>10<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup>

</p><p>The issue above mentioned is a result of an important <a href="Ethical_relativist" class="mw-redirect" title="Ethical relativist">ethical relativist</a> critique. Even if "oughts" depend on goals, the ought seems to vary with the person's goal. This is the conclusion of the <a href="Ethical_subjectivist" class="mw-redirect" title="Ethical subjectivist">ethical subjectivist</a>, who says a person can only be called good according to whether they fulfill their own, <i>self-assigned</i> goal. Alasdair MacIntyre himself suggests that a person's purpose comes from their culture, making him a sort of ethical relativist.<sup id="cite_ref-11" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-11"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>11<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> Ethical relativists acknowledge local, institutional facts about what is right, but these are facts that can still vary by society. Thus, without an objective "moral goal", a moral ought is difficult to establish. <a href="G._E._M._Anscombe" title="G. E. M. Anscombe">G. E. M. Anscombe</a> was particularly critical of the word "ought" for this reason; understood as "We need such-and-such, and will only get it this way"—for somebody may need something immoral, or else find that their noble need requires immoral action.<sup id="cite_ref-:0_12-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-:0-12"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>12<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup><sup class="reference nowrap"><span title="Page / location: 19">: 19 </span></sup> Anscombe would even go as far to suggest that "the concepts of obligation, and duty—<i>moral</i> obligation and <i>moral</i> duty, that is to say—and of what is <i>morally</i> right and wrong, and of the <i>moral</i> sense of 'ought,' ought to be jettisoned if this is psychologically possible".<sup id="cite_ref-:0_12-1" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-:0-12"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>12<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup><sup class="reference nowrap"><span title="Page / location: 1">: 1 </span></sup>

</p><p>If moral goals depend on private assumptions or public agreement, so may morality as a whole. For example, Canada might call it good to maximize global welfare, where a citizen, Alice, calls it good to focus on herself, and then her family, and finally her friends (with little empathy for strangers). It does not seem that Alice can be objectively or rationally bound—without regard to her personal values <i>nor</i> those of groups of other people—to act a certain way. In other words, we may not be able to say "You just <i>should</i> do this". Moreover, persuading her to help strangers would necessarily mean appealing to values she already possesses (or else we would never even have a hope of persuading her).<sup id="cite_ref-13" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-13"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>13<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> This is another interest of <a href="Normative_ethics" title="Normative ethics">normative ethics</a>—questions of <a href="Normative_ethics#Binding_force" title="Normative ethics">binding forces</a>.

</p><p>There may be responses to the above relativistic critiques. As mentioned above, ethical realists that are non-natural can appeal to God's purpose for humankind. On the other hand, naturalistic thinkers may posit that valuing people's well-being is somehow "obviously" the purpose of ethics, or else the only relevant purpose worth talking about. This is the move made by <a href="Natural_law" title="Natural law">natural law</a>, <a href="Scientific_moralist" class="mw-redirect" title="Scientific moralist">scientific moralists</a> and some <a href="Utilitarians" class="mw-redirect" title="Utilitarians">utilitarians</a>.

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<div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Institutional_facts">Institutional facts</h3></div>

<p><a href="John_Searle" title="John Searle">John Searle</a> also attempts to derive "ought" from "is".<sup id="cite_ref-14" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-14"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>14<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> He tries to show that the act of making a promise places one under an obligation by definition, and that such an obligation amounts to an "ought". This view is still widely debated, and to answer criticisms, Searle has further developed the concept of <a href="Institutional_fact" class="mw-redirect" title="Institutional fact">institutional facts</a>, for example, that a certain building <i>is</i> in fact a bank and that certain paper <i>is</i> in fact money, which would seem to depend upon general recognition of those institutions and their value.<sup id="cite_ref-15" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-15"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>15<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup>

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<div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Indefinables">Indefinables</h3></div>

<p>Indefinables are concepts so global that they cannot be defined; rather, in a sense, they themselves, and the objects to which they refer, define our reality and our ideas. Their meanings cannot be stated in a true definition, but their meanings can be referred to instead by being placed with their incomplete definitions in <a href="Self-evident" class="mw-redirect" title="Self-evident">self-evident</a> statements, the truth of which can be tested by whether or not it is impossible to think the opposite without a contradiction. Thus, the truth of indefinable concepts and propositions using them is entirely a matter of logic.

</p><p>An example of the above is that of the concepts "finite parts" and "wholes"; they cannot be defined without reference to each other and thus with some amount of circularity, but we can make the self-evident statement that "the whole is greater than any of its parts", and thus establish a meaning particular to the two concepts.

</p><p>These two notions being granted, it can be said that statements of "ought" are measured by their <i>prescriptive</i> truth, just as statements of "is" are measured by their <i>descriptive</i> truth; and the descriptive truth of an "is" judgment is defined by its correspondence to reality (actual or in the mind), while the prescriptive truth of an "ought" judgment is defined according to a more limited scope—its correspondence to right desire (conceivable in the mind and able to be found in the rational appetite, but not in the more "actual" reality of things independent of the mind or rational appetite).<sup id="cite_ref-prescriptive_truths_16-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-prescriptive_truths-16"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>16<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup>

</p><p>To some, this may immediately suggest the question: "How can we know what is a right desire if it is already admitted that it is not based on the more actual reality of things independent of the mind?" The beginning of the answer is found when we consider that the concepts "good", "bad", "right" and "wrong" are indefinables. Thus, right desire cannot be defined properly, but a way to refer to its meaning <i>may</i> be found through a self-evident prescriptive truth.<sup id="cite_ref-definables_17-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-definables-17"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>17<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup>

</p><p>That self-evident truth which the moral cognitivist claims to exist upon which all other prescriptive truths are ultimately based is: <i>One ought to desire what is really good for one and nothing else.</i> The terms "real good" and "right desire" cannot be defined apart from each other, and thus their definitions would contain some degree of circularity, but the stated self-evident truth indicates a meaning particular to the ideas sought to be understood, and it is (the moral cognitivist might claim) impossible to think the opposite without a contradiction. Thus combined with other descriptive truths of what is good (goods in particular considered in terms of whether they suit a particular end and the limits to the possession of such particular goods being compatible with the general end of the possession of the total of all real goods throughout a whole life), a valid body of knowledge of right desire is generated.<sup id="cite_ref-self-evident_18-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-self-evident-18"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>18<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup>

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<div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Functionalist_counterexamples">Functionalist counterexamples</h3></div>

<p>Several counterexamples have been offered by philosophers claiming to show that there are cases when an "ought" logically follows from an "is." First of all, <a href="Hilary_Putnam" title="Hilary Putnam">Hilary Putnam</a>, by tracing back the quarrel to Hume's dictum, claims fact/value entanglement as an objection, since the distinction between them entails a value. <a href="Arthur_Prior" title="Arthur Prior">A. N. Prior</a> points out, from the statement "He is a sea captain," it logically follows, "He ought to do what a sea captain ought to do."<sup id="cite_ref-FOOTNOTEMacIntyre1981[httpsarchiveorgdetailsaftervirtuestudy0000macipage54_54]_19-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-FOOTNOTEMacIntyre1981[httpsarchiveorgdetailsaftervirtuestudy0000macipage54_54]-19"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>19<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> <a href="Alasdair_MacIntyre" title="Alasdair MacIntyre">Alasdair MacIntyre</a> points out, from the statement "This watch is grossly inaccurate and irregular in time-keeping and too heavy to carry about comfortably," the evaluative conclusion validly follows, "This is a bad watch."<sup id="cite_ref-FOOTNOTEMacIntyre1981[httpsarchiveorgdetailsaftervirtuestudy0000macipage57_57-58]_20-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-FOOTNOTEMacIntyre1981[httpsarchiveorgdetailsaftervirtuestudy0000macipage57_57-58]-20"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>20<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> John Searle points out, from the statement "Jones promised to pay Smith five dollars," it logically follows that "Jones ought to pay Smith five dollars." The act of promising by definition places the promiser under obligation.<sup id="cite_ref-21" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-21"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>21<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup>

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<div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Moral_realism">Moral realism</h3></div>

<p><a href="Philippa_Foot" title="Philippa Foot">Philippa Foot</a> adopts a <a href="Moral_realism" title="Moral realism">moral realist</a> position, criticizing the idea that when evaluation is superposed on fact there has been a "committal in a new dimension."<sup id="cite_ref-22" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-22"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>22<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> She introduces, by analogy, the practical implications of using the word "injury." Not just anything counts as an injury. There must be some impairment. If one supposes a man wants the things the injury prevents him from obtaining, has one fallen into the old naturalist fallacy? She states the following:

</p>

<blockquote class="templatequote"><p>It may seem that the only way to make a necessary connection between "injury" and the things that are to be avoided, is to say that it is only used in an "action-guiding sense" when applied to something the speaker intends to avoid. But we should look carefully at the crucial move in that argument, and query the suggestion that someone might happen not to want anything for which he would need the use of hands or eyes. Hands and eyes, like ears and legs, play a part in so many operations that a man could only be said not to need them if he had no wants at all.<sup id="cite_ref-FOOTNOTEFoot195996_23-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-FOOTNOTEFoot195996-23"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>23<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup></p></blockquote>

<p>Foot argues that the virtues, like hands and eyes in the analogy, play so large a part in so many operations that it is implausible to suppose that a committal in a non-naturalist dimension is necessary to demonstrate their goodness.

</p>

<blockquote class="templatequote"><p>Philosophers who have supposed that actual action was required if "good" were to be used in a sincere evaluation have got into difficulties over weakness of will, and they should surely agree that enough has been done if we can show that any man has reason to aim at virtue and avoid vice. But is this impossibly difficult if we consider the kinds of things that count as virtue and vice? Consider, for instance, the cardinal virtues, prudence, temperance, courage and justice. Obviously any man needs prudence, but does he not also need to resist the temptation of pleasure when there is harm involved? And how could it be argued that he would never need to face what was fearful for the sake of some good? It is not obvious what someone would mean if he said that temperance or courage were not good qualities, and this not because of the "praising" sense of these words, but because of the things that courage and temperance are.<sup id="cite_ref-FOOTNOTEFoot195997_24-0" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-FOOTNOTEFoot195997-24"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>24<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup></p></blockquote>

<div class="mw-heading mw-heading3"><h3 id="Misunderstanding">Misunderstanding</h3></div>

<p><a href="Hilary_Putnam" title="Hilary Putnam">Hilary Putnam</a> argues that philosophers who accept Hume's "is–ought" distinction reject his reasons in making it, and thus undermine the entire claim.<sup id="cite_ref-25" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-25"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>25<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup>

</p><p>Various scholars have also indicated that, in the very work where Hume argues for the is–ought problem, Hume himself derives an "ought" from an "is".<sup id="cite_ref-26" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-26"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>26<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup> Such seeming inconsistencies in Hume have led to an ongoing debate over whether Hume actually held to the is–ought problem in the first place, or whether he meant that ought inferences can be made but only with good argumentation.<sup id="cite_ref-27" class="reference"><a href="#cite_note-27"><span class="cite-bracket">[</span>27<span class="cite-bracket">]</span></a></sup>

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<ul><li><a href="Anthropic_principle" title="Anthropic principle">Anthropic principle</a></li>

<li><a href="Appeal_to_nature" title="Appeal to nature">Appeal to nature</a></li>

<li><a href="Best_of_all_possible_worlds" title="Best of all possible worlds">Best of all possible worlds</a></li>

<li><a href="Big_Book_(thought_experiment)" title="Big Book (thought experiment)">Big Book (thought experiment)</a></li>

<li><a href="Buridan's_ass" title="Buridan's ass">Buridan's ass</a></li>

<li><a href="Deontic_logic" title="Deontic logic">Deontic logic</a></li>

<li><a href="Fact%E2%80%93value_distinction" title="Fact–value distinction">Fact–value distinction</a></li>

<li><a href="Humeanism#Metaethics" title="Humeanism">Humeanism § Metaethics</a></li>

<li><i><a href="The_Moral_Landscape" title="The Moral Landscape">The Moral Landscape</a></i></li>

<li><a href="Moral_responsibility" title="Moral responsibility">Moral responsibility</a></li>

<li><a href="Normative_economics" class="mw-redirect" title="Normative economics">Normative economics</a></li>

<li><a href="Normative_science" title="Normative science">Normative science</a></li>

<li><a href="Positive_economics" class="mw-redirect" title="Positive economics">Positive economics</a></li>

<li><a href="Proximate_and_ultimate_causation" title="Proximate and ultimate causation">Proximate and ultimate causation</a></li>

<li><a href="Science_of_morality" title="Science of morality">Science of morality</a></li>

<li><a href="Situational_ethics" title="Situational ethics">Situational ethics</a></li></ul></div>

<div class="mw-heading mw-heading2"><h2 id="References">References</h2></div>

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</style><cite id="CITEREFBlack1964" class="citation journal cs1"><a href="Max_Black" title="Max Black">Black, Max</a> (1964). "The Gap Between "Is" and "Should"". <i><a href="The_Philosophical_Review" title="The Philosophical Review">The Philosophical Review</a></i>. <b>73</b> (2): <span class="nowrap">165–</span>181. <a href="Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.2307%2F2183334">10.2307/2183334</a>. <a href="ISSN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISSN (identifier)">ISSN</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://search.worldcat.org/issn/0031-8108">0031-8108</a>. <a href="JSTOR_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="JSTOR (identifier)">JSTOR</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2183334">2183334</a>.</cite></span>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-sep-2"><span class="mw-cite-backlink">^ <a href="#cite_ref-sep_2-0"><sup><i><b>a</b></i></sup></a> <a href="#cite_ref-sep_2-1"><sup><i><b>b</b></i></sup></a></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFCohon2004" class="citation encyclopaedia cs1">Cohon, Rachel (29 October 2004) [29 October 2004]. <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20230525190538/https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/hume-moral/">"Hume's Moral Philosophy"</a>. In <a href="Edward_N._Zalta" title="Edward N. Zalta">Zalta, Edward N.</a> (ed.). <i><a href="Stanford_Encyclopedia_of_Philosophy" title="Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy">Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy</a></i> (Fall 2018 ed.). Archived from <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/hume-moral">the original</a> on 25 May 2023.</cite></span>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-3"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-3">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFHume" class="citation cs1"><a href="David_Hume" title="David Hume">Hume, David</a>. <span class="cs1-ws-icon" title="s:Treatise of Human Nature/Book 3: Of morals/Part 1/Section 1"><a class="external text external" href="https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Treatise_of_Human_Nature/Book_3:_Of_morals/Part_1/Section_1">"Section 1" </a></span>. <i><a href="Treatise_of_Human_Nature" class="mw-redirect" title="Treatise of Human Nature">Treatise of Human Nature</a></i>. p. 469-470 – via <a href="Wikisource" title="Wikisource">Wikisource</a>.</cite></span>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-4"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-4">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFHume1739" class="citation book cs1"><a href="David_Hume" title="David Hume">Hume, David</a> (1739). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://books.google.com/books?id=-Sp8B0ZdyAYC&q=%22every+system+of+morality%22&pg=PA335"><i>A Treatise of Human Nature</i></a>. London: John Noon. p. 335. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>9781595478597</bdi><span class="reference-accessdate">. Retrieved <span class="nowrap">2011-12-06</span></span>.</cite> <span class="cs1-hidden-error citation-comment"><code class="cs1-code">{{cite book}}</code>: </span><span class="cs1-hidden-error citation-comment">ISBN / Date incompatibility (help)</span></span>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-5"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-5">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFPriest2007" class="citation book cs1"><a href="Stephen_Priest" title="Stephen Priest">Priest, Stephen</a> (2007). <span class="id-lock-limited" title="Free access subject to limited trial, subscription normally required"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://archive.org/details/britishempiricis00prie"><i>The British Empiricists</i></a></span>. <a href="Routledge" title="Routledge">Routledge</a>. pp. <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://archive.org/details/britishempiricis00prie/page/n193">177</a>–78. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>978-0-415-35723-4</bdi>.</cite></span>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-6"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-6">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFBrown2017" class="citation journal cs1">Brown, Campbell (7 June 2017). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.26556%2Fjesp.v9i1.170">"Two Versions of Hume's Law"</a>. <i>Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy</i>. <b>9</b> (1): <span class="nowrap">1–</span>8. <a href="Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<span class="id-lock-free" title="Freely accessible"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.26556%2Fjesp.v9i1.170">10.26556/jesp.v9i1.170</a></span>.</cite></span>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-7"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-7">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFGuevara2008" class="citation journal cs1">Guevara, Daniel (September 2008). "Rebutting formally valid counterexamples to the Humean "is-ought" dictum". <i><a href="Synthese" title="Synthese">Synthese</a></i>. <b>164</b> (1): <span class="nowrap">45–</span>60. <a href="Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1007%2Fs11229-007-9215-4">10.1007/s11229-007-9215-4</a>. <a href="S2CID_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="S2CID (identifier)">S2CID</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:14961374">14961374</a>.</cite></span>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-after_virtue-8"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-after_virtue_8-0">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFMacIntyre1981" class="citation book cs1"><a href="Alasdair_MacIntyre" title="Alasdair MacIntyre">MacIntyre, Alasdair</a> (1981). <span class="id-lock-registration" title="Free registration required"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://archive.org/details/aftervirtuestudy0000maci"><i>After Virtue: A Study in Moral Philosophy</i></a></span>. Notre Dame, IN: <a href="University_of_Notre_Dame_Press" title="University of Notre Dame Press">University of Notre Dame Press</a>. pp. <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://archive.org/details/aftervirtuestudy0000maci/page/148">148–50</a>. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>9780268005948</bdi>.</cite></span>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-9"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-9">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFHart1994" class="citation book cs1"><a href="H._L._A._Hart" title="H. L. A. Hart">Hart, H. L. A.</a> (1994). <a href="The_Concept_of_Law" title="The Concept of Law"><i>The Concept of Law</i></a>. <a href="Oxford_University_Press" title="Oxford University Press">Oxford University Press</a>. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>9780198761228</bdi>.</cite></span>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-10"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-10">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text">These ideas are discussed extensively in <cite id="CITEREFJoyce2001" class="citation book cs1"><a href="Richard_Joyce_(philosopher)" title="Richard Joyce (philosopher)">Joyce, Richard</a> (2001). <i>The Myth of Morality</i>. <a href="Cambridge_University_Press" title="Cambridge University Press">Cambridge University Press</a>. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>9780521808064</bdi>.</cite></span>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-11"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-11">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text">Discussed in <cite id="CITEREFMackie1997" class="citation book cs1"><a href="J._L._Mackie" title="J. L. Mackie">Mackie, J. L.</a> (1997). <a href="Ethics%3A_Inventing_Right_and_Wrong" title="Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong"><i>Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong</i></a>. <a href="Penguin_Books" title="Penguin Books">Penguin Books</a>. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>978-0-14-021957-9</bdi>.</cite></span>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-:0-12"><span class="mw-cite-backlink">^ <a href="#cite_ref-:0_12-0"><sup><i><b>a</b></i></sup></a> <a href="#cite_ref-:0_12-1"><sup><i><b>b</b></i></sup></a></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFAnscombe1958" class="citation journal cs1"><a href="G._E._M._Anscombe" title="G. E. M. Anscombe">Anscombe, Elizabeth</a> (1958). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1017%2Fs0031819100037943">"Modern Moral Philosophy"</a>. <i><a href="Philosophy_(journal)" title="Philosophy (journal)">Philosophy</a></i>. <b>33</b> (124): <span class="nowrap">1–</span>19. <a href="Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<span class="id-lock-free" title="Freely accessible"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1017%2Fs0031819100037943">10.1017/s0031819100037943</a></span>. <a href="JSTOR_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="JSTOR (identifier)">JSTOR</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/3749051">3749051</a>. <a href="S2CID_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="S2CID (identifier)">S2CID</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://api.semanticscholar.org/CorpusID:197875941">197875941</a>.</cite></span>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-13"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-13">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFBlackford2010" class="citation journal cs1"><a href="Russell_Blackford" title="Russell Blackford">Blackford, Russell</a> (December 2010). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/document?repid=rep1&type=pdf&doi=ec180a6b07efa681a28b62d468ddea5dfef7583f">"Book review: Sam Harris' The Moral Landscape"</a>. <i><a href="Journal_of_Evolution_and_Technology" class="mw-redirect" title="Journal of Evolution and Technology">Journal of Evolution and Technology</a></i>. <b>21</b> (2): <span class="nowrap">53–</span>62.</cite></span>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-14"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-14">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFSearle1964" class="citation journal cs1"><a href="John_Searle" title="John Searle">Searle, John R.</a> (1964). "How to Derive 'Ought' From 'Is'". <i><a href="The_Philosophical_Review" title="The Philosophical Review">The Philosophical Review</a></i>. <b>73</b> (1): <span class="nowrap">43–</span>58. <a href="Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.2307%2F2183201">10.2307/2183201</a>. <a href="JSTOR_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="JSTOR (identifier)">JSTOR</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://www.jstor.org/stable/2183201">2183201</a>.</cite></span>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-15"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-15">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFSearle1995" class="citation book cs1"><a href="John_Searle" title="John Searle">Searle, John R.</a> (1995). <span class="id-lock-registration" title="Free registration required"><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://archive.org/details/constructionofso00sear"><i>The construction of social reality</i></a></span>. New York: <a href="Free_Press_(publisher)" title="Free Press (publisher)">Free Press</a>. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>0-02-928045-1</bdi>.</cite></span>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-prescriptive_truths-16"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-prescriptive_truths_16-0">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text">see <cite id="CITEREFAristotle1911" class="citation cs1"><a href="Aristotle" title="Aristotle">Aristotle</a> (1911). <span class="cs1-ws-icon" title="s:Nicomachean Ethics (Chase)/Book Six#II"><a class="external text external" href="https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Nicomachean_Ethics_(Chase)/Book_Six#II">"Book Six" </a></span>. <i><a href="Nicomachean_Ethics" title="Nicomachean Ethics">Nicomachean Ethics</a></i>. Translated by <a href="Drummond_Percy_Chase" title="Drummond Percy Chase">Chase, D. P.</a> <a href="J.M._Dent_%26_Sons" class="mw-redirect" title="J.M. Dent & Sons">J.M. Dent & Sons</a>. <span class="cs1-ws-icon" title="s:Nicomachean Ethics (Chase)/Book Six#II"><a class="external text external" href="https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Nicomachean_Ethics_(Chase)/Book_Six#II">6.2 </a></span>. <a href="OCLC_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="OCLC (identifier)">OCLC</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://search.worldcat.org/oclc/1085665737">1085665737</a> – via <a href="Wikisource" title="Wikisource">Wikisource</a>.</cite></span>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-definables-17"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-definables_17-0">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text">As an example of philosophical argumentation that identifies particular indefinables, we take "being" and then "good". Aristotle stated that although being is not a genus (<i>Posterior Analytics</i> 2.7), yet of everything that is, being is predicated (<i>Topics</i> 4.1), and that the <a href="Genus-differentia_definition" class="mw-redirect" title="Genus-differentia definition">Genus-differentia definitions</a>, of which he was the first recorded proponent, requires that its subject be defined through its genus and a differentia. But since nothing lies outside of what is predicated of being, there is nothing which can serve as a differentia. So being is postulated to be indefinable. Later, Aquinas made an <a href="Argument" title="Argument">argument</a> that stated, "Good and being are really the same, and differ only according to reason.... [G]ood presents the aspect of desirableness, which being does not present." (<i>Summa Theologica</i>, Part I, Q. 5, Art. 1) So good is postulated to be indefinable.</span>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-self-evident-18"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-self-evident_18-0">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text">See for example <cite id="CITEREFRuggiero2001" class="citation book cs1">Ruggiero, Vincent R. (2001). "Chapter 6". <i>Thinking Critically About Ethical Issues</i> (5th ed.). <a href="McGraw_Hill_Education" title="McGraw Hill Education">McGraw Hill</a>. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>9780767415828</bdi>.</cite></span>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-FOOTNOTEMacIntyre1981[httpsarchiveorgdetailsaftervirtuestudy0000macipage54_54]-19"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEMacIntyre1981[httpsarchiveorgdetailsaftervirtuestudy0000macipage54_54]_19-0">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><a href="#CITEREFMacIntyre1981">MacIntyre 1981</a>, p. <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://archive.org/details/aftervirtuestudy0000maci/page/54">54</a>.</span>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-FOOTNOTEMacIntyre1981[httpsarchiveorgdetailsaftervirtuestudy0000macipage57_57-58]-20"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-FOOTNOTEMacIntyre1981[httpsarchiveorgdetailsaftervirtuestudy0000macipage57_57-58]_20-0">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><a href="#CITEREFMacIntyre1981">MacIntyre 1981</a>, p. <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://archive.org/details/aftervirtuestudy0000maci/page/57">57-58</a>.</span>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-21"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-21">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFMacNiven1993" class="citation book cs1">MacNiven, Don (1993). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://archive.org/details/creativemorality0000macn/page/40/mode/2up"><i>Creative Morality</i></a> (1st ed.). <a href="Routledge" title="Routledge">Routledge</a>. pp. <span class="nowrap">41–</span>42. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>978-0-415-00030-7</bdi>.</cite></span>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-22"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-22">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFFoot1959" class="citation journal cs1"><a href="Philippa_Foot" title="Philippa Foot">Foot, Philippa</a> (1959-06-01). "V—Moral Beliefs". <i><a href="Proceedings_of_the_Aristotelian_Society" class="mw-redirect" title="Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society">Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society</a></i>. <b>59</b> (1): <span class="nowrap">83–</span>104. <a href="Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1093%2Faristotelian%2F59.1.83">10.1093/aristotelian/59.1.83</a>. <a href="ISSN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISSN (identifier)">ISSN</a> <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://search.worldcat.org/issn/1467-9264">1467-9264</a>.</cite></span>

</li>

</li>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-25"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-25">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFPutnam2002" class="citation book cs1"><a href="Hilary_Putnam" title="Hilary Putnam">Putnam, Hilary</a> (2002). <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://archive.org/details/hilary-putnam-the-collapse-of-the-fact-value-dichotomy-and-other-essays-harvard-university-press-2004"><i>The Collapse of the Fact-Value Dichotomy and Other Essays</i></a>. <a href="Harvard_University_Press" title="Harvard University Press">Harvard University Press</a>. pp. <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://archive.org/details/hilary-putnam-the-collapse-of-the-fact-value-dichotomy-and-other-essays-harvard-university-press-2004/page/21">21-22</a>. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>978-0-674-00905-9</bdi>.</cite></span>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-26"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-26">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFBaier2010" class="citation book cs1"><a href="Annette_Baier" title="Annette Baier">Baier, Annette C.</a> (2010). "Hume's Own 'Ought' Conclusions". In Pigden, Charles R. (ed.). <i>Hume on Is and Ought</i>. Hampshire: <a href="Palgrave_Macmillan" title="Palgrave Macmillan">Palgrave Macmillan</a>. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>9780230205208</bdi>.</cite></span>

</li>

<li id="cite_note-27"><span class="mw-cite-backlink"><b><a href="#cite_ref-27">^</a></b></span> <span class="reference-text"><cite id="CITEREFPigden2010" class="citation book cs1">Pigden, Charles R. (2010). <i>Hume on Is and Ought</i>. Hampshire: <a href="Palgrave_Macmillan" title="Palgrave Macmillan">Palgrave Macmillan</a>. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>9780230205208</bdi>.</cite></span>

</li>

</ol></div>

<div class="mw-heading mw-heading2"><h2 id="Further_reading">Further reading</h2></div>

<ul><li><cite id="CITEREFHudson1969" class="citation book cs1"><a href="W._D._Hudson" title="W. D. Hudson">Hudson, William Donald</a> (1969). Hudson, W. D. (ed.). <i>The Is-Ought Question : A Collection of Papers on the Central Problem in Moral Philosophy</i>. London: <a href="Palgrave_Macmillan" title="Palgrave Macmillan">Palgrave Macmillan</a>. <a href="Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1007%2F978-1-349-15336-7">10.1007/978-1-349-15336-7</a>. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>978-0-333-10597-9</bdi>.</cite></li>

<li><cite id="CITEREFPigden2010" class="citation book cs1">Pigden, Charles R. (2010). <i>Hume on Is and Ought</i>. Hampshire: <a href="Palgrave_Macmillan" title="Palgrave Macmillan">Palgrave Macmillan</a>. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>9780230205208</bdi>.</cite></li>

<li><cite id="CITEREFSchurz1997" class="citation book cs1">Schurz, Gerhard (1997). <i>The Is-Ought Problem : An Investigation in Philosophical Logic</i>. Trends in Logic. Vol. 1. <a href="Springer_Science%2BBusiness_Media" title="Springer Science+Business Media">Springer Science+Business Media</a>. <a href="Doi_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="Doi (identifier)">doi</a>:<a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://doi.org/10.1007%2F978-94-017-3375-5">10.1007/978-94-017-3375-5</a>. <a href="ISBN_(identifier)" class="mw-redirect" title="ISBN (identifier)">ISBN</a> <bdi>9789401733755</bdi>.</cite></li></ul>

<div class="mw-heading mw-heading2"><h2 id="External_links">External links</h2></div>

<ul><li><cite id="CITEREFCohon" class="citation encyclopaedia cs1">Cohon, Rachel. <a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume-moral/#io/">"Hume's Moral Philosophy: Is and Ought"</a>. In <a href="Edward_N._Zalta" title="Edward N. Zalta">Zalta, Edward N.</a> (ed.). <i><a href="Stanford_Encyclopedia_of_Philosophy" title="Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy">Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy</a></i>.</cite></li>

<li><a rel="nofollow" class="external text" href="http://www.open.edu/openlearn/history-the-arts/culture/philosophy/the/ought-problem">Is Ought Problem animation from The Open University and BBC Radio 4</a></li></ul>

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</style><div id="David_Hume45" style="font-size:114%;margin:0 4em"><a href="David_Hume" title="David Hume">David Hume</a></div></th></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%">Books</th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-odd hlist" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em">

<ul><li><i><a href="A_Treatise_of_Human_Nature" title="A Treatise of Human Nature">A Treatise of Human Nature</a></i></li>

<li><i><a href="An_Enquiry_Concerning_Human_Understanding" title="An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding">An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding</a></i></li>

<li><i><a href="An_Enquiry_Concerning_the_Principles_of_Morals" title="An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals">An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals</a></i></li>

<li><i><a href="Essays%2C_Moral%2C_Political%2C_and_Literary" title="Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary">Essays, Moral, Political, and Literary</a></i></li>

<li><i><a href="Four_Dissertations" title="Four Dissertations">Four Dissertations</a></i></li>

<li><i><a href="Dialogues_Concerning_Natural_Religion" title="Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion">Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion</a></i></li>

<li><i><a href="The_History_of_England_(Hume)" class="mw-redirect" title="The History of England (Hume)">The History of England</a></i>

<ul><li><i><a href="The_History_of_England_(Hume)" class="mw-redirect" title="The History of England (Hume)">The History of Great Britain</a></i></li></ul></li></ul>

</div></td></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%">Criticism</th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-even hlist" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em">

<ul><li><a href="Teleological_argument#British_empiricists" title="Teleological argument">Argument for the existence of God from design</a></li>

<li><a href="Problem_of_induction" title="Problem of induction">Problem of induction</a></li>

</ul>

</div></td></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%">Philosophy</th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-odd hlist" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em">

<ul><li><a href="Hume's_principle" title="Hume's principle">Hume's principle</a></li>

<li><a href="The_Missing_Shade_of_Blue" title="The Missing Shade of Blue">The Missing Shade of Blue</a></li>

<li>"<a href="Of_Miracles" title="Of Miracles">Of Miracles</a>"</li>

<li><a href="Scottish_Enlightenment" title="Scottish Enlightenment">Scottish Enlightenment</a></li>

<li><a href="Empiricists" class="mw-redirect" title="Empiricists">Empiricism</a></li>

<li><a href="Price%E2%80%93specie_flow_mechanism" title="Price–specie flow mechanism">Price–specie flow mechanism</a></li></ul>

</div></td></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%">Related</th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-even hlist" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em">

<ul><li><i><a href="Hume_Studies" title="Hume Studies">Hume Studies</a></i></li>

<li><i><a href="A_Treatise_of_Human_Nature_(Abstract)" title="A Treatise of Human Nature (Abstract)">A Treatise of Human Nature (Abstract)</a></i></li>

<li><a href="Extraordinary_claims_require_extraordinary_evidence" title="Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence">Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence</a></li></ul>

</div></td></tr></tbody></table></div>

<div class="navbox-styles"></div><div role="navigation" class="navbox" aria-labelledby="Epistemology722" style="padding:3px"><table class="nowraplinks hlist mw-collapsible mw-collapsed navbox-inner" style="border-spacing:0;background:transparent;color:inherit"><tbody><tr><th scope="col" class="navbox-title" colspan="2"><div id="Epistemology722" style="font-size:114%;margin:0 4em"><a href="Epistemology" title="Epistemology">Epistemology</a></div></th></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%"><a href="List_of_epistemologists" title="List of epistemologists">Epistemologists</a></th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-odd" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em">

<ul><li><a href="William_Alston" title="William Alston">William Alston</a></li>

<li><a href="Thomas_Aquinas" title="Thomas Aquinas">Aquinas</a></li>

<li><a href="Robert_Audi" title="Robert Audi">Robert Audi</a></li>

<li><a href="Augustine_of_Hippo" title="Augustine of Hippo">Augustine</a></li>

<li><a href="George_Berkeley" title="George Berkeley">George Berkeley</a></li>

<li><a href="Laurence_BonJour" title="Laurence BonJour">Laurence BonJour</a></li>

<li><a href="Gilles_Deleuze" title="Gilles Deleuze">Gilles Deleuze</a></li>

<li><a href="Keith_DeRose" title="Keith DeRose">Keith DeRose</a></li>

<li><a href="Ren%C3%A9_Descartes" title="René Descartes">René Descartes</a></li>

<li><a href="John_Dewey" title="John Dewey">John Dewey</a></li>

<li><a href="Fred_Dretske" title="Fred Dretske">Fred Dretske</a></li>

<li><a href="Edmund_Gettier" title="Edmund Gettier">Edmund Gettier</a></li>

<li><a href="Alvin_Goldman" title="Alvin Goldman">Alvin Goldman</a></li>

<li><a href="Nelson_Goodman" title="Nelson Goodman">Nelson Goodman</a></li>

<li><a href="Paul_Grice" title="Paul Grice">Paul Grice</a></li>

<li><a href="Anil_Gupta_(philosopher)" title="Anil Gupta (philosopher)">Anil Gupta</a></li>

<li><a href="Susan_Haack" title="Susan Haack">Susan Haack</a></li>

<li><a href="David_Hume" title="David Hume">David Hume</a></li>

<li><a href="Immanuel_Kant" title="Immanuel Kant">Immanuel Kant</a></li>

<li><a href="S%C3%B8ren_Kierkegaard" title="Søren Kierkegaard">Søren Kierkegaard</a></li>

<li><a href="Peter_D._Klein" title="Peter D. Klein">Peter Klein</a></li>

<li><a href="Saul_Kripke" title="Saul Kripke">Saul Kripke</a></li>

<li><a href="Hilary_Kornblith" title="Hilary Kornblith">Hilary Kornblith</a></li>

<li><a href="David_Lewis_(philosopher)" title="David Lewis (philosopher)">David Lewis</a></li>

<li><a href="John_Locke" title="John Locke">John Locke</a></li>

<li><a href="G._E._Moore" title="G. E. Moore">G. E. Moore</a></li>

<li><a href="John_McDowell" title="John McDowell">John McDowell</a></li>

<li><a href="Robert_Nozick" title="Robert Nozick">Robert Nozick</a></li>

<li><a href="Alvin_Plantinga" title="Alvin Plantinga">Alvin Plantinga</a></li>

<li><a href="Plato" title="Plato">Plato</a></li>

<li><a href="Duncan_Pritchard" title="Duncan Pritchard">Duncan Pritchard</a></li>

<li><a href="James_Pryor" title="James Pryor">James Pryor</a></li>

<li><a href="Hilary_Putnam" title="Hilary Putnam">Hilary Putnam</a></li>

<li><a href="Willard_Van_Orman_Quine" title="Willard Van Orman Quine">W. V. O. Quine</a></li>

<li><a href="Thomas_Reid" title="Thomas Reid">Thomas Reid</a></li>

<li><a href="Bertrand_Russell" title="Bertrand Russell">Bertrand Russell</a></li>

<li><a href="Gilbert_Ryle" title="Gilbert Ryle">Gilbert Ryle</a></li>

<li><a href="Wilfrid_Sellars" title="Wilfrid Sellars">Wilfrid Sellars</a></li>

<li><a href="Susanna_Siegel" title="Susanna Siegel">Susanna Siegel</a></li>

<li><a href="Ernest_Sosa" title="Ernest Sosa">Ernest Sosa</a></li>

<li><a href="P._F._Strawson" title="P. F. Strawson">P. F. Strawson</a></li>

<li><a href="Baruch_Spinoza" title="Baruch Spinoza">Baruch Spinoza</a></li>

<li><a href="Timothy_Williamson" title="Timothy Williamson">Timothy Williamson</a></li>

<li><a href="Ludwig_Wittgenstein" title="Ludwig Wittgenstein">Ludwig Wittgenstein</a></li>

<li><a href="Nicholas_Wolterstorff" title="Nicholas Wolterstorff">Nicholas Wolterstorff</a></li>

<li><a href="Vienna_Circle" title="Vienna Circle">Vienna Circle</a></li>

</div></td></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%">Theories</th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-even" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em">

<ul><li><a href="Coherentism" title="Coherentism">Coherentism</a></li>

<li><a href="Constructivist_epistemology" class="mw-redirect" title="Constructivist epistemology">Constructivism</a></li>

<li><a href="Contextualism" title="Contextualism">Contextualism</a></li>

<li><a href="Empiricism" title="Empiricism">Empiricism</a></li>

<li><a href="Evolutionary_epistemology" title="Evolutionary epistemology">Evolutionary epistemology</a></li>

<li><a href="Fallibilism" title="Fallibilism">Fallibilism</a></li>

<li><a href="Feminist_epistemology" title="Feminist epistemology">Feminist epistemology</a></li>

<li><a href="Fideism" title="Fideism">Fideism</a></li>

<li><a href="Foundationalism" title="Foundationalism">Foundationalism</a></li>

<li><a href="Semantic_holism" title="Semantic holism">Holism</a></li>

<li><a href="Infinitism" title="Infinitism">Infinitism</a></li>

<li><a href="Innatism" title="Innatism">Innatism</a></li>

<li><a href="Na%C3%AFve_realism" title="Naïve realism">Naïve realism</a></li>

<li><a href="Naturalized_epistemology" title="Naturalized epistemology">Naturalized epistemology</a></li>

<li><a href="Phenomenalism" title="Phenomenalism">Phenomenalism</a></li>

<li><a href="Positivism" title="Positivism">Positivism</a></li>

<li><a href="Rationalism" title="Rationalism">Rationalism</a></li>

<li><a href="Reductionism" title="Reductionism">Reductionism</a></li>

<li><a href="Reliabilism" title="Reliabilism">Reliabilism</a></li>

<li><a href="Direct_and_indirect_realism" title="Direct and indirect realism">Representational realism</a></li>

<li><a href="Philosophical_skepticism" title="Philosophical skepticism">Skepticism</a></li>

<li><a href="Transcendental_idealism" title="Transcendental idealism">Transcendental idealism</a></li></ul>

</div></td></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%">Concepts</th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-odd" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em">

<ul><li><a href="A_priori_and_a_posteriori" title="A priori and a posteriori"><i>A priori</i> knowledge</a></li>

<li><a href="A_priori_and_a_posteriori" title="A priori and a posteriori"><i>A posteriori</i> knowledge</a></li>

<li><a href="Philosophical_analysis" title="Philosophical analysis">Analysis</a></li>

<li><a href="Analytic%E2%80%93synthetic_distinction" title="Analytic–synthetic distinction">Analytic–synthetic distinction</a></li>

<li><a href="Belief" title="Belief">Belief</a></li>

<li><a href="Certainty" title="Certainty">Certainty</a></li>

<li><a href="Common_sense" title="Common sense">Common sense</a></li>

<li><a href="Descriptive_knowledge" class="mw-redirect" title="Descriptive knowledge">Descriptive knowledge</a></li>

<li><a href="Exploratory_thought" title="Exploratory thought">Exploratory thought</a></li>

<li><a href="Epistemic_injustice" title="Epistemic injustice">Epistemic injustice</a></li>

<li><a href="Epistemic_virtue" title="Epistemic virtue">Epistemic virtue</a></li>

<li><a href="Gettier_problem" title="Gettier problem">Gettier problem</a></li>

<li><a href="Inductive_reasoning" title="Inductive reasoning">Induction</a></li>

<li><a href="Internalism_and_externalism" title="Internalism and externalism">Internalism and externalism</a></li>

<li><a href="Justification_(epistemology)" title="Justification (epistemology)">Justification</a></li>

<li><a href="Knowledge" title="Knowledge">Knowledge</a></li>

<li><a href="Objectivity_(philosophy)" class="mw-redirect" title="Objectivity (philosophy)">Objectivity</a></li>

<li><a href="Privileged_access" class="mw-redirect" title="Privileged access">Privileged access</a></li>

<li><a href="Problem_of_induction" title="Problem of induction">Problem of induction</a></li>

<li><a href="Problem_of_other_minds" title="Problem of other minds">Problem of other minds</a></li>

<li><a href="Perception" title="Perception">Perception</a></li>

<li><a href="Procedural_knowledge" title="Procedural knowledge">Procedural knowledge</a></li>

<li><a href="Proposition" title="Proposition">Proposition</a></li>

<li><a href="Regress_argument" class="mw-redirect" title="Regress argument">Regress argument</a></li>

<li><a href="Simplicity" title="Simplicity">Simplicity</a></li>

<li><a href="Truth" title="Truth">Truth</a></li>

<li><a href="Uncertainty" title="Uncertainty">Uncertainty</a></li></ul>

</div></td></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%">Related articles</th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-even" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em">

<ul><li><a href="Faith_and_rationality" title="Faith and rationality">Faith and rationality</a></li>

<li><a href="Formal_epistemology" title="Formal epistemology">Formal epistemology</a></li>

<li><a href="Metaepistemology" title="Metaepistemology">Metaepistemology</a></li>

<li><a href="Philosophy_of_perception" title="Philosophy of perception">Philosophy of perception</a></li>

<li><a href="Philosophy_of_science" title="Philosophy of science">Philosophy of science</a></li>

<li><a href="Social_epistemology" title="Social epistemology">Social epistemology</a></li>

<li><a href="Virtue_epistemology" title="Virtue epistemology">Virtue epistemology</a></li></ul>

</div></td></tr><tr><td class="navbox-abovebelow" colspan="2"><div>

<ul><li><span class="noviewer" typeof="mw:File"><span title="Category"></span></span> Category</li>

<li><span class="noviewer" typeof="mw:File"><span title="Outline"></span></span> <a href="Outline_of_epistemology" title="Outline of epistemology">Outline</a></li>

<li><span class="noviewer" typeof="mw:File"></span> <a href="Portal%3APhilosophy" title="Portal:Philosophy">Portal</a></li>

<li><span class="noviewer" typeof="mw:File"><span title="WikiProject"></span></span> WikiProject</li>

<li>Stubs</li>

<li>Discussion</li></ul>

</div></td></tr></tbody></table></div>

<div class="navbox-styles"></div><div role="navigation" class="navbox" aria-labelledby="Jurisprudence727" style="padding:3px"><table class="nowraplinks hlist mw-collapsible autocollapse navbox-inner" style="border-spacing:0;background:transparent;color:inherit"><tbody><tr><th scope="col" class="navbox-title" colspan="2"><div id="Jurisprudence727" style="font-size:114%;margin:0 4em"><a href="Jurisprudence" title="Jurisprudence">Jurisprudence</a></div></th></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%"><a href="Legal_theory" class="mw-redirect" title="Legal theory">Legal theory</a></th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-odd" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em">

<ul><li><a href="Constitutionalism" title="Constitutionalism">Constitutionalism</a></li>

<li><a href="Critical_legal_studies" title="Critical legal studies">Critical legal studies</a></li>

<li><a href="Comparative_law" title="Comparative law">Comparative law</a></li>

<li><a href="Law_and_economics" title="Law and economics">Economic analysis</a></li>

<li><a href="Legal_norms" class="mw-redirect" title="Legal norms">Legal norms</a></li>

<li><a href="International_legal_theory" class="mw-redirect" title="International legal theory">International legal theory</a></li>

<li><a href="Legal_history" title="Legal history">Legal history</a></li>

<li><a href="Philosophy_of_law" class="mw-redirect" title="Philosophy of law">Philosophy of law</a></li>

<li><a href="Sociology_of_law" title="Sociology of law">Sociology of law</a></li></ul>

</div></td></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%">Philosophers</th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-even" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em">

<ul><li><a href="Robert_Alexy" title="Robert Alexy">Alexy</a></li>

<li><a href="Thomas_Aquinas" title="Thomas Aquinas">Aquinas</a></li>

<li><a href="Aristotle" title="Aristotle">Aristotle</a></li>

<li><a href="John_Austin_(legal_philosopher)" title="John Austin (legal philosopher)">Austin</a></li>

<li><a href="Fr%C3%A9d%C3%A9ric_Bastiat" title="Frédéric Bastiat">Bastiat</a></li>

<li><a href="Cesare_Beccaria" title="Cesare Beccaria">Beccaria</a></li>

<li><a href="Jeremy_Bentham" title="Jeremy Bentham">Bentham</a></li>

<li><a href="William_Blackstone" title="William Blackstone">Blackstone</a></li>

<li><a href="Norberto_Bobbio" title="Norberto Bobbio">Bobbio</a></li>

<li><a href="Bartosz_Bro%C5%BCek" title="Bartosz Brożek">Brożek</a></li>

<li><a href="Benjamin_N._Cardozo" title="Benjamin N. Cardozo">Cardozo</a></li>

<li><a href="%C3%89mile_Durkheim" title="Émile Durkheim">Durkheim</a></li>

<li><a href="Ronald_Dworkin" title="Ronald Dworkin">Dworkin</a></li>

<li><a href="Eugen_Ehrlich" title="Eugen Ehrlich">Ehrlich</a></li>

<li><a href="John_Finnis" title="John Finnis">Finnis</a></li>

<li><a href="Lon_L._Fuller" title="Lon L. Fuller">Fuller</a></li>

<li><a href="Hugo_Grotius" title="Hugo Grotius">Grotius</a></li>

<li><a href="Georges_Gurvitch" title="Georges Gurvitch">Gurvitch</a></li>

<li><a href="J%C3%BCrgen_Habermas" title="Jürgen Habermas">Habermas</a></li>

<li><a href="Karl_Ludwig_von_Haller" title="Karl Ludwig von Haller">Haller</a></li>

<li><a href="Georg_Wilhelm_Friedrich_Hegel" title="Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel">Hegel</a></li>

<li><a href="Thomas_Hobbes" title="Thomas Hobbes">Hobbes</a></li>

<li><a href="Axel_H%C3%A4gerstr%C3%B6m" title="Axel Hägerström">Hägerström</a></li>

<li><a href="Georg_Jellinek" title="Georg Jellinek">Jellinek</a></li>

<li><a href="Rudolf_von_Jhering" title="Rudolf von Jhering">Jhering</a></li>

<li><a href="Hans_Kelsen" title="Hans Kelsen">Kelsen</a></li>

<li><a href="Bruno_Leoni" title="Bruno Leoni">Leoni</a></li>

<li><a href="Karl_Llewellyn" title="Karl Llewellyn">Llewellyn</a></li>

<li><a href="Niklas_Luhmann" title="Niklas Luhmann">Luhmann</a></li>

<li><a href="Joseph_de_Maistre" title="Joseph de Maistre">Maistre</a></li>

<li><a href="Montesquieu" title="Montesquieu">Montesquieu</a></li>

<li><a href="Adam_M%C3%BCller" title="Adam Müller">Müller</a></li>

<li><a href="Martha_Nussbaum" title="Martha Nussbaum">Nussbaum</a></li>

<li><a href="Karl_Olivecrona" title="Karl Olivecrona">Olivecrona</a></li>

<li><a href="Evgeny_Pashukanis" title="Evgeny Pashukanis">Pashukanis</a></li>

<li><a href="Cha%C3%AFm_Perelman" title="Chaïm Perelman">Perelman</a></li>

<li><a href="Leon_Petra%C5%BCycki" title="Leon Petrażycki">Petrażycki</a></li>

<li><a href="Plato" title="Plato">Plato</a></li>

<li><a href="Richard_Posner" title="Richard Posner">Posner</a></li>

<li><a href="Roscoe_Pound" title="Roscoe Pound">Pound</a></li>

<li><a href="Samuel_von_Pufendorf" title="Samuel von Pufendorf">Pufendorf</a></li>

<li><a href="Gustav_Radbruch" title="Gustav Radbruch">Radbruch</a></li>

<li><a href="John_Rawls" title="John Rawls">Rawls</a></li>

<li><a href="Adolf_Reinach" title="Adolf Reinach">Reinach</a></li>

<li><a href="Karl_Renner" title="Karl Renner">Renner</a></li>

<li><a href="Friedrich_Carl_von_Savigny" title="Friedrich Carl von Savigny">Savigny</a></li>

<li><a href="Quintus_Mucius_Scaevola_Pontifex" title="Quintus Mucius Scaevola Pontifex">Scaevola</a></li>

<li><a href="Carl_Schmitt" title="Carl Schmitt">Schmitt</a></li>

<li><a href="Shang_Yang" title="Shang Yang">Shang</a></li>

<li><a href="Francisco_Su%C3%A1rez" title="Francisco Suárez">Suárez</a></li>

<li><a href="Friedrich_Julius_Stahl" title="Friedrich Julius Stahl">Stahl</a></li>

<li><a href="Roberto_Mangabeira_Unger" title="Roberto Mangabeira Unger">Unger</a></li>

<li><a href="Eric_Voegelin" title="Eric Voegelin">Voegelin</a></li>

<li><a href="Jeremy_Waldron" title="Jeremy Waldron">Waldron</a></li>

<li><a href="Michael_Walzer" title="Michael Walzer">Walzer</a></li>

<li><a href="Max_Weber" title="Max Weber">Weber</a></li></ul>

</div></td></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%">Works</th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-odd" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em">

<li><i><a href="Treatise_on_Law" title="Treatise on Law">Treatise on Law</a></i> <span style="font-size: 85%;">(c. 1270)</span></li>

<li><i><a href="The_Spirit_of_Law" title="The Spirit of Law">The Spirit of Law</a></i> <span style="font-size: 85%;">(1748)</span></li>

<li><i><a href="Elements_of_the_Philosophy_of_Right" title="Elements of the Philosophy of Right">Elements of the Philosophy of Right</a></i> <span style="font-size: 85%;">(1820)</span></li>

<li><i><a href="Pure_Theory_of_Law" title="Pure Theory of Law">Pure Theory of Law</a></i> <span style="font-size: 85%;">(1934)</span></li>

<li><i><a href="The_Concept_of_Law" title="The Concept of Law">The Concept of Law</a></i> <span style="font-size: 85%;">(1961)</span></li>

<li><i><a href="Natural_Law_and_Natural_Rights" title="Natural Law and Natural Rights">Natural Law and Natural Rights</a></i> <span style="font-size: 85%;">(1980)</span></li>

<li><i><a href="Law's_Empire" title="Law's Empire">Law's Empire</a></i> <span style="font-size: 85%;">(1986)</span></li></ul>

<ul><li><a href="Analytical_jurisprudence" title="Analytical jurisprudence">Analytical jurisprudence</a></li>

<li><a href="Deontological_ethics" class="mw-redirect" title="Deontological ethics">Deontological ethics</a></li>

<li><a href="Philosophy%2C_theology%2C_and_fundamental_theory_of_Catholic_canon_law" title="Philosophy, theology, and fundamental theory of Catholic canon law">Fundamental theory of Catholic canon law</a></li>

<li><a href="German_historical_school" title="German historical school">German historical school</a></li>

<li><a href="Interpretivism_(legal)" title="Interpretivism (legal)">Interpretivism</a></li>

<li><a href="Legal_moralism" title="Legal moralism">Legal moralism</a></li>

<li><a href="Legal_positivism" title="Legal positivism">Legal positivism</a></li>

<li><a href="Legal_realism" title="Legal realism">Legal realism</a></li>

<li><a href="Legalism_(Chinese_philosophy)" title="Legalism (Chinese philosophy)">Legalism</a></li>

<li><a href="Libertarian_theories_of_law" title="Libertarian theories of law">Libertarian theories of law</a></li>

<li><a href="Natural_law" title="Natural law">Natural law</a></li>

<li><a href="Paternalism" title="Paternalism">Paternalism</a></li>

<li><a href="Utilitarianism" title="Utilitarianism">Utilitarianism</a></li>

<li><a href="Virtue_jurisprudence" title="Virtue jurisprudence">Virtue jurisprudence</a></li></ul>

<ul><li><a href="Constitutional_amendment" title="Constitutional amendment">Constitutional amendment</a></li>

<li><i><a href="Dharma" title="Dharma">Dharma</a></i></li>

<li><a href="Judicial_interpretation" title="Judicial interpretation">Judicial interpretation</a></li>

<li><a href="Judicial_reform" title="Judicial reform">Judicial reform</a></li>

<li><a href="Justice" title="Justice">Justice</a></li>

<li><a href="Law_without_the_state" title="Law without the state">Law without the state</a></li>

<li><a href="List_of_country_legal_systems" class="mw-redirect" title="List of country legal systems">Legal system</a></li>

<li><a href="Question_of_law" title="Question of law">Question of law</a></li>

<li><a href="Rational-legal_authority" title="Rational-legal authority">Rational-legal authority</a></li>

</div></td></tr><tr><td class="navbox-abovebelow" colspan="2"><div>

<ul><li><span class="noviewer" typeof="mw:File"><span title="Category"></span></span> Category</li>

<li><span class="noviewer" typeof="mw:File"></span> <a href="Portal%3ALaw" title="Portal:Law">Law portal</a></li>

<li><a href="Portal%3APhilosophy" title="Portal:Philosophy">Philosophy portal</a></li>

<li><span class="noviewer" typeof="mw:File"><span title="WikiProject"></span></span> WikiProject Law</li>

<li>WikiProject Philosophy</li>

<li><a class="external text external" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Special:Recentchangeslinked&target=Template:Jurisprudence&hidebots=0">changes</a></li></ul>

</div></td></tr></tbody></table></div>

<div class="navbox-styles"></div><div role="navigation" class="navbox" aria-labelledby="Philosophy_of_science517" style="padding:3px"><table class="nowraplinks hlist mw-collapsible autocollapse navbox-inner" style="border-spacing:0;background:transparent;color:inherit"><tbody><tr><th scope="col" class="navbox-title" colspan="2"><div id="Philosophy_of_science517" style="font-size:114%;margin:0 4em"><a href="Philosophy_of_science" title="Philosophy of science">Philosophy of science</a></div></th></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%">Concepts</th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-odd" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em">

<ul><li><a href="Philosophical_analysis" title="Philosophical analysis">Analysis</a></li>

<li><a href="Analytic%E2%80%93synthetic_distinction" title="Analytic–synthetic distinction">Analytic–synthetic distinction</a></li>

<li><a href="A_priori_and_a_posteriori" title="A priori and a posteriori"><i>A priori</i> and <i>a posteriori</i></a></li>

<li><a href="Causality" title="Causality">Causality</a>

<ul><li><a href="Mill's_Methods" class="mw-redirect" title="Mill's Methods">Mill's Methods</a></li></ul></li>

<li><a href="Commensurability_(philosophy_of_science)" title="Commensurability (philosophy of science)">Commensurability</a></li>

<li><a href="Consilience" title="Consilience">Consilience</a></li>

<li><a href="Construct_(philosophy)" title="Construct (philosophy)">Construct</a></li>

<li><a href="Correlation" title="Correlation">Correlation</a>

<ul><li><a href="Correlation_function" title="Correlation function">function</a></li></ul></li>

<li><a href="Creative_synthesis" title="Creative synthesis">Creative synthesis</a></li>

<li><a href="Demarcation_problem" title="Demarcation problem">Demarcation problem</a></li>

<li><a href="Empirical_evidence" title="Empirical evidence">Empirical evidence</a></li>

<li><a href="Experiment" title="Experiment">Experiment</a>

<ul><li><a href="Design_of_experiments" title="Design of experiments">design</a></li></ul></li>

<li><a href="Explanatory_power" title="Explanatory power">Explanatory power</a></li>

<li><a href="Falsifiability" title="Falsifiability">Falsifiability</a></li>

<li><a href="Feminist_method" title="Feminist method">Feminist method</a></li>

<li><a href="Functional_contextualism" title="Functional contextualism">Functional contextualism</a></li>

<li><a href="Hypothesis" title="Hypothesis">Hypothesis</a>

<ul><li><a href="Alternative_hypothesis" title="Alternative hypothesis">alternative</a></li>

<li><i><a href="Ignoramus_et_ignorabimus" title="Ignoramus et ignorabimus">Ignoramus et ignorabimus</a></i></li>

<li><a href="Inductive_reasoning" title="Inductive reasoning">Inductive reasoning</a></li>

<li><a href="Intertheoretic_reduction" title="Intertheoretic reduction">Intertheoretic reduction</a></li>

<li><a href="Inquiry" title="Inquiry">Inquiry</a></li>

<li><a href="Measurement" title="Measurement">Measurement</a></li>

<li><a href="Nature_(philosophy)" title="Nature (philosophy)">Nature</a></li>

<li><a href="Objectivity_(philosophy)" class="mw-redirect" title="Objectivity (philosophy)">Objectivity</a></li>

<li><a href="Observation" title="Observation">Observation</a></li>

<li><a href="Paradigm" title="Paradigm">Paradigm</a></li>

<li><a href="Problem_of_induction" title="Problem of induction">Problem of induction</a></li>

<li><a href="Scientific_evidence" title="Scientific evidence">Scientific evidence</a>

<ul><li><a href="Evidence-based_practice" title="Evidence-based practice">Evidence-based practice</a></li></ul></li>

<li><a href="Scientific_law" title="Scientific law">Scientific law</a></li>

<li><a href="Scientific_method" title="Scientific method">Scientific method</a></li>

<li><a href="Scientific_pluralism" title="Scientific pluralism">Scientific pluralism</a></li>

<li><a href="Scientific_Revolution" title="Scientific Revolution">Scientific Revolution</a></li>

<li><a href="Testability" title="Testability">Testability</a></li>

<li><a href="Theory" title="Theory">Theory</a>

<ul><li><a href="Theory_choice" title="Theory choice">choice</a></li>

<li><a href="Theory-ladenness" title="Theory-ladenness">ladenness</a></li>

<li><a href="Scientific_theory" title="Scientific theory">scientific</a></li></ul></li>

<li><a href="Underdetermination" title="Underdetermination">Underdetermination</a></li>

<li><a href="Unity_of_science" title="Unity of science">Unity of science</a></li>

<li><a href="Variable_and_attribute_(research)" title="Variable and attribute (research)">Variable</a>

<ul><li><a href="Control_variable" title="Control variable">control</a></li>

<li><a href="Dependent_and_independent_variables" title="Dependent and independent variables">dependent and independent</a></li></ul></li></ul>

<ul><li><a href="Coherentism" title="Coherentism">Coherentism</a></li>

<li><a href="Confirmation_holism" title="Confirmation holism">Confirmation holism</a></li>

<li><a href="Constructive_empiricism" title="Constructive empiricism">Constructive empiricism</a></li>

<li><a href="Constructive_realism" title="Constructive realism">Constructive realism</a></li>

<li><a href="Constructivist_epistemology" class="mw-redirect" title="Constructivist epistemology">Constructivist epistemology</a></li>

<li><a href="Contextualism" title="Contextualism">Contextualism</a></li>

<li><a href="Conventionalism" title="Conventionalism">Conventionalism</a></li>

<li><a href="Deductive-nomological_model" title="Deductive-nomological model">Deductive-nomological model</a></li>

<li><a href="Epistemological_anarchism" class="mw-redirect" title="Epistemological anarchism">Epistemological anarchism</a></li>

<li><a href="Evolutionism" title="Evolutionism">Evolutionism</a></li>

<li><a href="Fallibilism" title="Fallibilism">Fallibilism</a></li>

<li><a href="Foundationalism" title="Foundationalism">Foundationalism</a></li>

<li><a href="Hypothetico-deductive_model" title="Hypothetico-deductive model">Hypothetico-deductive model</a></li>

<li><a href="Inductionism" title="Inductionism">Inductionism</a></li>

<li><a href="Instrumentalism" title="Instrumentalism">Instrumentalism</a></li>

<li><a href="Model-dependent_realism" title="Model-dependent realism">Model-dependent realism</a></li>

<li><a href="Naturalism_(philosophy)" title="Naturalism (philosophy)">Naturalism</a></li>

<li><a href="Physicalism" title="Physicalism">Physicalism</a></li>

<li><a href="Positivism" title="Positivism">Positivism</a> / <a href="Reductionism" title="Reductionism">Reductionism</a> / <a href="Determinism" title="Determinism">Determinism</a></li>

<li><a href="Pragmatism" title="Pragmatism">Pragmatism</a></li>

<li><a href="Rationalism" title="Rationalism">Rationalism</a> / <a href="Empiricism" title="Empiricism">Empiricism</a></li>

<li><a href="Received_view_of_theories" title="Received view of theories">Received view</a> / <a href="Semantic_view_of_theories" title="Semantic view of theories">Semantic view of theories</a></li>

<li><a href="Scientific_essentialism" title="Scientific essentialism">Scientific essentialism</a></li>

<li><a href="Scientific_formalism" title="Scientific formalism">Scientific formalism</a></li>

<li><a href="Scientific_realism" title="Scientific realism">Scientific realism</a> / <a href="Anti-realism" title="Anti-realism">Anti-realism</a></li>

<li><a href="Scientific_skepticism" title="Scientific skepticism">Scientific skepticism</a></li>

<li><a href="Scientism" title="Scientism">Scientism</a></li>

<li><a href="Structuralism_(philosophy_of_science)" title="Structuralism (philosophy of science)">Structuralism</a></li>

<li><a href="Uniformitarianism" title="Uniformitarianism">Uniformitarianism</a></li>

<li><a href="Verificationism" title="Verificationism">Verificationism</a></li>

<li><a href="Vitalism" title="Vitalism">Vitalism</a></li></ul>

</div></td></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%">Philosophy of...</th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-odd" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em">

<ul><li><a href="Philosophy_of_biology" title="Philosophy of biology">Biology</a></li>

<li><a href="Philosophy_of_chemistry" title="Philosophy of chemistry">Chemistry</a></li>

<li><a href="Philosophy_of_physics" title="Philosophy of physics">Physics</a>

<ul><li><a href="Philosophy_of_space_and_time" title="Philosophy of space and time">Space and time</a></li></ul></li>

<li><a href="Philosophy_of_social_science" title="Philosophy of social science">Social science</a>

<ul><li><a href="Philosophy_of_archaeology" title="Philosophy of archaeology">Archaeology</a></li>

<li><a href="Philosophy_of_economics" class="mw-redirect" title="Philosophy of economics">Economics</a></li>

<li><a href="Philosophy_of_geography" title="Philosophy of geography">Geography</a></li>

<li><a href="Philosophy_of_history" title="Philosophy of history">History</a></li>

<li><a href="Philosophy_of_linguistics" title="Philosophy of linguistics">Linguistics</a></li>

<li><a href="Philosophy_of_psychology" title="Philosophy of psychology">Psychology</a></li></ul></li></ul>

</div></td></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%">Related topics</th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-even" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em">

<ul><li><a href="Criticism_of_science" title="Criticism of science">Criticism of science</a></li>

<li><a href="Descriptive_research" title="Descriptive research">Descriptive science</a></li>

<li><a href="Epistemology" title="Epistemology">Epistemology</a></li>

<li><a href="Exact_sciences" title="Exact sciences">Exact sciences</a></li>

<li><a href="Faith_and_rationality" title="Faith and rationality">Faith and rationality</a></li>

<li><a href="Hard_and_soft_science" title="Hard and soft science">Hard and soft science</a></li>

<li><a href="History_and_philosophy_of_science" title="History and philosophy of science">History and philosophy of science</a></li>

<li><a href="Non-science" title="Non-science">Non-science</a>

<ul><li><a href="Pseudoscience" title="Pseudoscience">Pseudoscience</a></li></ul></li>

<li><a href="Normative_science" title="Normative science">Normative science</a></li>

<li><a href="Protoscience" title="Protoscience">Protoscience</a></li>

<li><a href="Questionable_cause" title="Questionable cause">Questionable cause</a></li>

<li><a href="Relationship_between_religion_and_science" title="Relationship between religion and science">Relationship between religion and science</a></li>

<li><a href="Rhetoric_of_science" title="Rhetoric of science">Rhetoric of science</a></li>

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<li><a href="Sociology_of_scientific_ignorance" title="Sociology of scientific ignorance">Sociology of scientific ignorance</a></li>

<li><a href="Sociology_of_scientific_knowledge" title="Sociology of scientific knowledge">Sociology of scientific knowledge</a></li></ul>

</div></td></tr><tr><th scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:1%"><a href="List_of_philosophers_of_science" title="List of philosophers of science">Philosophers of science</a></th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-odd" style="width:100%;padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em"></div><table class="nowraplinks navbox-subgroup" style="border-spacing:0"><tbody><tr><th id="Precursors10" scope="row" class="navbox-group" style="width:7.5em">Precursors</th><td class="navbox-list-with-group navbox-list navbox-odd" style="padding:0"><div style="padding:0 0.25em">

<ul><li><a href="Roger_Bacon" title="Roger Bacon">Roger Bacon</a></li>

<li><a href="Francis_Bacon" title="Francis Bacon">Francis Bacon</a></li>

<li><a href="Galileo_Galilei" title="Galileo Galilei">Galileo Galilei</a></li>

<li><a href="Isaac_Newton" title="Isaac Newton">Isaac Newton</a></li>

<li><a href="David_Hume" title="David Hume">David Hume</a></li></ul>

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<ul><li><a href="Auguste_Comte" title="Auguste Comte">Auguste Comte</a></li>

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<li><a href="Pierre_Duhem" title="Pierre Duhem">Pierre Duhem</a></li>

<li><a href="Rudolf_Steiner" title="Rudolf Steiner">Rudolf Steiner</a></li>

<li><a href="Karl_Pearson" title="Karl Pearson">Karl Pearson</a></li>

<li><a href="Charles_Sanders_Peirce" title="Charles Sanders Peirce">Charles Sanders Peirce</a></li>

<li><a href="Wilhelm_Windelband" title="Wilhelm Windelband">Wilhelm Windelband</a></li>

<li><a href="Alfred_North_Whitehead" title="Alfred North Whitehead">Alfred North Whitehead</a></li>

<li><a href="Bertrand_Russell" title="Bertrand Russell">Bertrand Russell</a></li>

<li><a href="Otto_Neurath" title="Otto Neurath">Otto Neurath</a></li>

<li><a href="C._D._Broad" title="C. D. Broad">C. D. Broad</a></li>

<li><a href="Michael_Polanyi" title="Michael Polanyi">Michael Polanyi</a></li>

<li><a href="Hans_Reichenbach" title="Hans Reichenbach">Hans Reichenbach</a></li>

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<li><a href="Carl_Gustav_Hempel" title="Carl Gustav Hempel">Carl Gustav Hempel</a></li>

<li><a href="Willard_Van_Orman_Quine" title="Willard Van Orman Quine">W. V. O. Quine</a></li>

<li><a href="Thomas_Kuhn" title="Thomas Kuhn">Thomas Kuhn</a></li>

<li><a href="Imre_Lakatos" title="Imre Lakatos">Imre Lakatos</a></li>

<li><a href="Paul_Feyerabend" title="Paul Feyerabend">Paul Feyerabend</a></li>

<li><a href="Ian_Hacking" title="Ian Hacking">Ian Hacking</a></li>

<li><a href="Bas_van_Fraassen" title="Bas van Fraassen">Bas van Fraassen</a></li>

<li><a href="Larry_Laudan" title="Larry Laudan">Larry Laudan</a></li></ul></div></td></tr><tr><td class="navbox-abovebelow" colspan="2"><div>

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